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EcENT Css
TORTS-BIGHT OF PRcAC.- Plaintiffs fifteen-year-old daughter was
killed in an automobile accident. Defendant police officer, while of-
ficially investigating the accident, photographed her mutilated body,
and later showed the photograph to her classmates to demonstrate a
safety lesson. Defendant was awarded summary judgment on the
ground that he had the right to "take and publish" the photograph.
Held: Reversed. There existed two material issues of fact: (1) whether
the protograph was identified when published; and (2) the nature
and purpose of the publication. Sellers v. Henry, 829 S.W.2d 214
(Ky. 1959).
The right of privacy was developed for the protection of the in-
terest of the individual in "not having his affairs known to others, or
having his likeness exhibited to the public.' It is not the purpose of this
comment to re-examine the development of the right of privacy,2
but rather to consider three issues raised by the Sellers case: (1)
who may bring an action; (2) the extent of the right; and (8) identi-
fication of the photograph as a requirement.for recovery.
Who May Bring Action
The Sellers case is based on the theory that publication of the
child's photograph is an invasion of the parents' right of privacy,
and not that the parents should be able to recover on behalf of the
child for an invasion of her right.
Kentucky became the second jurisdiction 3 to recognize the invasion
of the right of privacy as a tort in Brents v. Morgan.4 The definition of
the right of privacy given in the Brents case is "the right to be let
alone, that is, the right of a person to be free from unwarranted
publicity, or the right to live without unwarranted interference
by the public about matters with which the public is not neces-
sarily concerned."5 This definition, like the Restatement definition
above,( describes the right of privacy as a personal right. However,
it will permit recovery in a case such as Sellers v. Henry, while the
Restatement would confine recovery to cases where the plaintifl's
likeness was published.
7
'R estatement, Torts § 867 (1939).
2See Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 487 (1950).
3 Georgia was the first jurisdiction to recognize the right of privacy. See
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
4221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
5 Id. at 770, 299 S.W. at 970.
6 See note 1 supra.
For an extreme example, see Friedman v. Cincinnati Local Joint Executive
Bd., 20 Ohio Op. 473 (1941). cited in Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22, 51 (1942). An
injunction was issued to restrain labor pickets from making motion pictures
of plaintif's business patrons on grounds that this was an invasion of the plain-
tiffs right of privacy.
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In view of Douglas v. Stokes,8 it is not surprising that the Ken-
tucky court in the principal case refused to uphold a summary judg-
ment granted to a defendant who had published a photograph of the
mutilated body of the plaintiffs child. In the Douglas case, a father
had employed a photographer to take pictures of the dead body of his
deformed child and to deliver to him a certain number of prints. The
court upheld a judgment for the parents who had brought suit
against the photographer for having the photograph copyrighted.
This case was cited in Brents v. Morgan9 as having granted re-
covery for invasion of the right of privacy. Although some believe
that the decision in the Douglas case was actually based on breach of
contract, the court indicated that it would grant recovery for an in-
vasion of the right of privacy when it said:
A man may recover for any injury or indignity done to the body,
and it would be a reproach to the law if physical injuries might be
recovered for and not those incorporeal injuries which would cause
much greater suffering and humiliation.' 0
The typical situation involving the right of privacy is where an
individual's name, signature, or photograph is used for some com-
mercial purpose, such as the advertising of a product. The writer of
the Kentucky Law Journal note referred to above"- suggested that
there existed an excellent possibility that the Kentucky court would
grant recovery for the non-commercial use of a photograph. The
Sellers case goes beyond that prediction since the court used words
which indicate that it will grant recovery for the non-commercial
use of a photograph, even if the photograph is that of the mutilated
body of the plaintiff's child, provided that (1) the publication was
not in the public interest; and (2) there was some identification
of the photograph at the time of publication.
The Extent of the Right
In the Sellers case, the court held:
While the question of whether the publication of such a photo-
graph as is here involved is in the public interest is one of law,
it is a type of legal question the answer to which is peculiarly de-
pendent upon factual details.
12
The trial court, in awarding summary judgment for the defendant,
considered only the complaint and an affidavit of the defendant which
stated that he was required to investigate the accident and it was in
8 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912).
9221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
10 149 Ky. at 509, 149 S.W. at 850.
11 Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 487 (1950).
12 329 S.W.2d at 216.
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the public interest that the pictures should be taken and published.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court must consider the
nature of the publication, and if, upon further proceedings, it de-
velops that there is no genuine issue about these facts, a summary
judgment will be proper; the decision is to whether the publication
was in the public interest is one of law, dependent upon the factual
details of the publication.
The court in the principal case indicated that "a regular news-
paper account of an occurrence of public and general interest does
not constitute an actionable invasion of the right of privacy."13 It
would appear, therefore, that the newspapers have gained an un-
qualified right to publish photographs concerning current news events,
regardless of how gruesome the photographs are. This concept was
recognized in Jones v. Herald Post Co.,14 where the court said,
There are times, however, when one, whether willingly or not,
becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest.
When this takes place, he emerges from his seclusion, and it is
not an invasion of his right of privacy to publish his photograph
with an account of such occurrence. 15
In the Herald Post case, an action was brought for damages for the
publication of a photograph of the plaintiff with a narrative of the
incident in which she had helped defend her husband against rob-
bers. The photograph was not one showing her in the act described,
but a regular portrait of her, which was taken sometime before.
The spirit of this doctrine appears to be that the public has a right
to an account of newsworthy items in the community, with photo-
graphs of the person involved, but not the right to view all of the
gruesome details of the incident.
The courts gave recognition to the right of privacy largely be-
cause of the unauthorized use of names and photographs of indi-
viduals in advertising products, and other similar commercial pub-
lications. At the present time, it appears that newspapers have a right
to publish any photograph, as long as it pertains to a current event.
The writer believes that sensationalism has crept into journalism
under the guise of public interest to such an extent that the courts
should begin to exercise the same control over published news photo-
graphs as they exercise over those published commercially.
The case of Waters v. Fleetwood,16 illustrates the unfortunate
consequences of the public interest, or current events test. In that
'3 Ibid.
14 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929).
' Id. at 229, 18 S.W.2d at 973.
16212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956).
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case the plaintiffs daughter had been the victim of an atrocious
crime; her body had been wrapped in chains and thrown into a river.
Upon recovery the body was photographed, a copy of the photo-
graph was published in the defendant's newspaper, and later, the
defendant sold copies of the photograph to the general public. The
court upheld the sustaining of a general demurrer to the complaint,
saying that the same rule would apply to the sale of the photo-
graph as applied to the newspaper account-they were both in the
public interest. It is difficult to see how a sale of such a photograph
to the public is in the public interest; furthermore, it is equally
difficult to see how the publication of the photograph in a news-
paper could be little more than catering to a sense of morbid curi-
osity. A narrative description along with a photograph of the little
girl while she was still alive would have sufficed to inform the pub-
lic of the incident; this would not violate the public interest concept
as presented in the Herald Post case,17 and it would protect the right
of the parents not to have the grotesque details of the incident re-
vealed to the public.
There are indications that some courts are not entirely satisfied
with the absolute right of newspapers to publish photographs in re-
porting news events regardless of how shocking they are. In Meetze
v. Associated Press,'8 the North Carolina court held that a news-
paper article reporting the fact that a twelve-year-old girl had given
birth to a normal, healthy son was not actionable, because it was not
offensive. However, the court said, "[N]ewsworthiness is not neces-
sarily the test. . . . 'Revelations may be so intimate and so unwar-
ranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's
notion of decency'."19 This view was also presented in a vigorous
dissent in an Iowa decision, where the dissenting judge said that the
court should recognize invasion where there is "extreme catering
to the morbid and sensational."20
Removing the unqualified right to public photographs of news
events would not involve censorship so as to invade freedom of the
press, but it would force the press to publish sensational photographs
at its own risk. The writer advocates that the right to publish photo-
graphs of news events be qualified by requiring that the publication
not offend the sensitivities of an ordinary person.
17 Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929).
18280 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
19 Id. at ,95 S.E.2d at 609, quoting from Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.,
113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).2 o Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d
762, 769 (1956).
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The Sellers case demonstrates that the public interest concept can
be extened to situations other than publication of photographs in
newspapers. This type of publication should be governed by the same
test as the one proposed for newspaper publications above. Thus
the factual consideration should include the nature of the publica-
tion and whether the publication would offend a person of ordinary
sensitivities. These are clearly questions of fact which should be
considered by the jury, since there could be differences of opinion
among reasonable men concerning them.
Identification as a Requirement for Recovery
One of the requirements for recovery is that there have been
some identification of the photograph at the time it was published.
This is a question of fact for the jury. It is not startling to impose
such a requirement as a prerequisite to recovery; an individual could
hardly contend that his privacy had been invaded unless he had
been identified. In the Sellers case, identification of the child from the
photograph was questionable. The court seemingly indicated that it
would allow recovery if there was some identification of the photo-
graph by the girl's classmates, regardless of whether it was explicit
at the time of publication.
Conclusion
The court will grant recovery for invasion of the right of privacy
of parents where a photograph of the mutilated body of their child
has been shown to her classmates to demonstrate a safety lesson, pro-
vided that the .publication was not in the public interest, and that
there was identification of the photograph at the time of publica-
tion. The trial court will decide as a matter of law, on retrial, whether
publication was in the public interest. If it was not, the jury will
decide whether there was identification of the deceased at the time
of publication. The writer advocates submitting to the jury the
question of whether the photograph is so gruesome as to offend
the sensitivities of an ordinary person, as a test of whether the pub-
lication is in the public interest, rather than basing the decision on
a current events test and deciding the question as a matter of law.
Durward W. Caudill
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